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FOREWORD 
 
 
When Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in 2005, it left a trail of unthinkable disruption 
and destruction to the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of families and 
communities.  It also left a painful scar on our national psyche.  The Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act of 2006 represented our national commitment to do better, putting in 
motion the most significant set of changes affecting emergency management in nearly thirty 
years.   
 
Although much has changed since another National Academy Panel released its 1993 report, 
Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People’s Needs 
in Natural and Manmade Disasters, many of the issues identified in that report remain relevant 
today: the need to build the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) institutional 
capacity, to develop a more functional relationship between headquarters and the regional 
offices, and to manage the interrelationships among levels of government.  
 
Congress recently requested that an independent Panel of the National Academy of Public 
Administration conduct a study of FEMA’s new statutory mandates to integrate preparedness 
with other emergency management activities and to build robust regional offices.  The Panel 
found that FEMA has made important progress in both areas, but concluded that the agency still 
faces significant challenges as it works to help build a prepared and resilient nation.   
 
The National Academy was pleased to conduct this important study for Congress and FEMA.  
On behalf of the Academy, I extend my appreciation to the members of the Panel for their 
excellent and diligent work.  I also thank FEMA’s leadership and representatives of stakeholder 
groups for facilitating access to critical information and contributing their own insights through 
in-person interviews, a focus group session, an electronic survey, and an online stakeholder 
dialogue. Finally, many thanks to the study team for their significant contributions to this 
complex and important project.   
 
  
 
 
  
 Jennifer L. Dorn 
President and Chief Executive Officer 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
During the first decade of the 21st Century, the American people experienced the terrorist attacks 
of September 11th, the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, and the threat of global health 
epidemics such as SARS and H1N1.  Given the significance of past events and future threats, 
Americans are relying more than ever on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
to “support our citizens and first responders to ensure that, as a nation, we work together to build, 
sustain and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and 
mitigate all hazards.”1  
 
Preparedness is essential to meet the nation’s increasingly complex emergency management 
challenges.  Through preparedness, the nation is able to: 
 
• Respond and recover more rapidly and effectively to disasters that will occur; 
• Prevent and mitigate other disasters; and 
• Reduce damage to life, property, and the environment.  
 
Many observers identified the erosion of preparedness, both inside and outside of FEMA, as a 
critical factor in the nation’s inadequate response to Katrina.2  Congress recognized the centrality 
of preparedness in its passage of Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) 
in October 2006.  This statute is intended to improve FEMA’s ability to prepare for, respond to, 
and assist recovery from disasters.  PKEMRA expanded FEMA’s mission to include the 
integration of preparedness with protection, response, recovery, and mitigation; the development 
of a risk-based all-hazards preparedness strategy; the building of robust regional offices to work 
with stakeholders; and increased coordination with other federal agencies.  
 
The National Academy was asked by Congress to conduct an independent assessment of 
FEMA’s implementation of several key PKEMRA mandates.  At the most fundamental level, the 
goal of PKEMRA is to build a more resilient nation by improving America’s preparedness.  In 
order to play its leadership role within the nation’s preparedness system, FEMA must not only 
integrate preparedness across all of its component programs, but also establish an effective 
division of responsibilities between headquarters and the regional offices.  FEMA headquarters 
should focus on policy development and dissemination, the maintenance of effective business 
practices across the agency, and monitoring the system’s performance.  FEMA’s regional offices 
should focus on implementing these policies and programs, as well as establishing and nurturing 
the critical relationships with stakeholders upon which preparedness is based.  PKEMRA 
mandated that the agency develop robust regional offices to carry out this critical role. 
 
National preparedness is not something that FEMA can achieve by itself.  A resilient nation will 
need a system of preparedness that relies on many entities outside of FEMA to play key roles. 
On a day-to-day basis, individuals, families, and local and state governments take primary 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Mission,” website, 
<http://www.fema.gov/about/index.shtm> (visited September 2009). 
2 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of 
Initiative (Washington, DC: February 2006), p. 158. 
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responsibility for preparedness and emergency management.  Because stakeholders possess most 
of the nation’s emergency management resources and experience, FEMA must ensure that it not 
only engages these parties, but also develops effective working partnerships that improve 
preparedness.  
 
Over the past three years, FEMA has taken significant steps in an effort to integrate preparedness 
and develop more robust regional offices. These efforts, undertaken by both the previous and 
current administrations, are documented throughout this report and should be recognized and 
applauded.  However, FEMA has yet to define specific goals and outcomes that would permit it, 
Congress or the public to determine when preparedness has been fully integrated into all aspects 
of FEMA’s work and whether the development and ongoing operation of robust regional offices 
has been achieved.  In the absence of well-defined, measurable outcome indicators, the National 
Academy Panel has relied upon the assessments of FEMA leaders and staff, documentation 
provided by FEMA, and a review of secondary sources material to inform its findings and 
recommendations.  Based upon this evidence, the Panel has concluded that, while progress has 
been made:  
 
1. Preparedness is not fully integrated across FEMA.  
2. FEMA’s regional offices do not yet have the capacity required to ensure the nation is 
fully prepared. 
3. Stakeholders are not yet full partners with FEMA in national preparedness. 
4. FEMA has ineffective internal business practices, particularly with regard to human 
resource management. 
 
This report presents the research and findings undertaken during the course of this study and 
presents seven recommendations that the Panel believes will enable FEMA to fulfill the promise 
of PKEMRA.  Table 1, below, summarizes the Panel’s recommendations, as well as key actions 
that FEMA must take to implement them.  A second volume of supplemental materials is 
available that provides the more detailed research and analyses conducted during the course of 
this study.3 
                                                 
3  This volume includes a review of PKEMRA and its related mandates; reviews and analyses of the extensive set of 
current secondary materials and studies of FEMA by entities including the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), the Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the Congressional Research 
Service (CRS); and reviews of policy and program guidance materials from DHS and FEMA. Primary research 
undertaken included interviews with key senior officials within FEMA at headquarters and in regional offices, 
representatives from stakeholder groups and outside experts; site visits to three regional offices (Regions One, 
Three, and Six); a focus group session with FEMA regional officials held in March 2009; an electronic survey of 
senior leadership within FEMA regional offices completed in April 2009; and, an online dialogue with state-level 
stakeholders completed in July 2009. 
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Table 1 
Summary of Panel Recommendations and Key FEMA Implementation Actions 
 
PREPAREDNESS INTEGRATION 
Panel Recommendations & Key Implementation Actions 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1. Establish a cross-organizational process, with participation from internal and external 
stakeholders, to develop a shared understanding of preparedness integration. 
2. Establish a robust set of outcome metrics and standards for preparedness integration, as well as 
a system to monitor and evaluate progress on an ongoing basis. 
3. Work to eliminate organizational barriers that are adversely impacting the full integration of 
preparedness across the agency. 
Key FEMA Actions 
Required for 
Implementation 
• Engage internal and external stakeholders in the development and promulgation of a 
preparedness integration vision. 
• Designate an internal Implementation Team for Preparedness Integration to monitor progress 
and report to senior leadership, as well as to regularly engage internal and external stakeholders 
in order to develop common understanding of preparedness integration. 
• Establish a process to recommend outcome measures for preparedness and preparedness 
integration utilizing expertise from FEMA headquarters and regions, as well as stakeholders 
from the state, local, and tribal levels. 
• Identify actions needed to reduce the negative effects of continued “stove-piping” between 
directorates and within programs (at both the headquarters and the regional office levels). 
ROBUST REGIONAL OFFICES 
Panel Recommendations & Key Implementation Actions 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4. Continue to build regional office capacity and monitor implementation consistent with the 
Administrator’s recent policy guidance. 
5. Undertake steps to improve the ongoing working relationship between headquarters and the 
regions in accord with Panel-identified principles. 
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Key FEMA Actions 
Required for 
Implementation 
• Determine whether additional transfer of authorities is warranted. 
• Develop a framework for evaluating how successful FEMA is in building robust regional 
offices. 
• Recommend metrics to assess regional office performance. 
• Incorporate regional expertise in task forces and working groups. 
• Establish temporary detail programs between headquarters and regional offices. 
• For SES and GS-15 positions, give preference to candidates who have experience at both the 
regional and headquarters levels. 
• Develop an appropriate mission, organization, and staffing for the Office of Regional Operations
STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
Panel Recommendations & Key Implementation Actions 
RECOMMENDATION 6. Take steps to improve stakeholder engagement and relationships at all levels in accord with 
Panel-identified principles 
Select FEMA Actions 
Required for 
Implementation 
• Review existing stakeholder engagement policies. 
• Develop stakeholder councils in each region. 
• Review and assess efforts targeting the public as stakeholders. 
• Collaborate with agencies such as CDC that have effective practices in citizen engagement on 
preparedness issues. 
INTERNAL BUSINESS PRACTICES 
Panel Recommendations & Key Implementation Actions 
RECOMMENDATION 7. Strengthen internal business practices, especially in the area of human capital planning. 
Select FEMA Actions 
Required for 
Implementation 
• Develop a valid five-year Strategic Human Capital Plan. 
• Develop a strategy to address and improve internal business practices. 
• Assess existing information systems, especially in the human capital area. 
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AGENCY HISTORY  
 
FEMA was established in April 1979, but catastrophic events have long been part of the 
American landscape.  The Constitution does not define a role for the federal government during 
disasters, and states and localities were originally left to their own devices.  However, by the 
early 19th century the federal government was drawn in.  In 1803, following a devastating fire in 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Congress acted to suspend the collection of federal tariffs until the 
community had recovered. 
 
By the end of the 19th century, Congress had passed more than 100 pieces of ad hoc legislation in 
response to individual events that exceeded local and state governments’ capacity to respond.  As 
the size and impact of catastrophic events continued to mount, the federal government was faced 
with increasing calls for assistance.  In 1900, 12,000 inhabitants perished in the Galveston 
hurricane, leading to further federal government involvement in disaster relief.  Less than twenty 
years later, in 1918, the nation faced a new form of catastrophe: the Great Influenza Pandemic.  
This time national resources were mobilized to respond, but still, some 675,000 American lives 
ere lost.  By mid-century, a hodgepodge of disaster related programs and responsibilities were 
scattered across federal agencies.  Drawing most of these programs together, President Carter 
established FEMA by Executive Order in 1979.  By 1988, additional actions were taken under 
the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act), consolidating federal 
statutory authorities that continue to guide FEMA’s actions and activities today.  In 1992, 
Hurricane Andrew, a Category 5 hurricane, left a trail of destruction across southern Florida and 
the Gulf Coast, leading to calls for reform across the entire emergency management system.4   
 
Less than ten years later, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created, enfolding twenty-two federal entities into 
a single department.  FEMA became part of DHS and faced structural and resource changes, as a 
number of functions were elevated to the departmental level.  In August 2005, the Gulf coast of 
the United States was hit by three devastating hurricanes—Katrina, Rita, and Wilma—and, as the 
world watched, national, state, and local efforts fell short. Following extensive inquiry and 
debate, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) was passed 
by Congress and signed into law, ushering in new reforms and resources directed at FEMA and 
the entire emergency management system.  
 
FEMA’s Mission and Role 
 
FEMA has a critical mission, but it is narrower than much of the public perceives.  FEMA’s 
primary mission is “…to support our citizens and first responders to ensure that as a nation we 
work together to build, sustain, and improve our capability to prepare for, protect against, 
respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards.”5   
 
                                                 
4 See the National Academy’s report Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet 
People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters, 1993.  
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, “FEMA Mission,” website, 
<http://www.fema.gov/about/index.shtm> (visited September 2009). 
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In the event of a disaster or other emergency, first response is the responsibility of local 
government emergency services, who may get assistance from nearby communities, the state 
government, and volunteer agencies. FEMA’s role as a first responder is limited to emergencies 
involving a federal asset, such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 or the Space Shuttle 
Columbia disaster in 2003.   
 
If a catastrophic disaster occurs that is beyond the capacity of local and state authorities to 
handle, the governor may ask the President to declare a major disaster.  In that case, FEMA 
assumes responsibility for marshalling and coordinating the needed federal resources for search 
and rescue, electrical power, food, water, shelter and other basic human needs.  Funding 
becomes available from the President’s Disaster Relief Fund (which is managed by FEMA) and 
the disaster aid programs of other federal agencies.  A Presidential Major Disaster Declaration 
also triggers long-term federal recovery programs, some of which must be matched by state 
programs, that provide financial and other assistance to affected individuals, businesses and 
public entities in the declared area.  
 
FEMA is most active in the realm of preparedness.  Through preparedness grant programs, 
FEMA provides significant support for equipping and training emergency response personnel 
and units throughout the nation.  PKEMRA reallocated selected preparedness functions and 
resources that had been centralized in DHS back to FEMA. FEMA became the clearly 
designated locus of responsibility for ensuring the nation’s preparedness.  Under PKEMRA, 
FEMA is required to:6 
 
• Integrate its emergency preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation 
responsibilities to confront effectively the challenges of natural disasters, acts of 
terrorism, or other man-made disasters; 
• Develop and coordinate implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for 
preparedness that builds common capabilities necessary to respond to natural disaster, 
acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters; 
• Develop and maintain robust regional offices that will work with state, local, and tribal 
governments; emergency response providers; and other appropriate entities to identify 
and address regional priorities; and 
• Coordinate with the Commandant of the Coast Guard, Director of Customs and Border 
Protection, Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, National Operations 
Center, and other agencies to take full advantage of resources in DHS. 
 
Against this backdrop of statutory and organizational change, Congress requested the National 
Academy of Public Administration undertake an independent assessment of FEMA’s efforts to 
integrate preparedness activities across its mission-related programs and to build robust regions. 
                                                 
6 One FEMA official acknowledged HSPD-8 (a December 2003 Presidential Directive) for creating “a pathway for 
national preparedness,” but contended “its shortcomings have contributed to some of the problems the [Academy 
Panel’s] report identifies.”  According to the official, HSPD-8 “did not define a federal-state relationship that 
adequately incorporates states in homeland security policy and strategy formulation,” focusing instead on 
“programmatic initiatives” as opposed to “requiring a comprehensive strategic approach to national preparedness, 
including a requirements definition and analysis process.”  
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STUDY BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The Academy convened a seven-member Panel of National Academy Fellows to review 
FEMA’s progress, guide the study team’s research and make recommendations.  Collectively, 
the Panel members have had extensive first hand experience in local, state, and federal 
government, including aspects of emergency management and preparedness, and have been 
recognized for their effective leadership within public administration and reform. Appendix A 
provides biographical sketches of the seven Panel members and key project staff.  
 
The Panel focused on addressing two central questions within its scope of work: 
 
1. What has FEMA done to integrate preparedness and to build robust regions? 
2. What has resulted from these changes?  
 
From October 2008 to August 2009, the Panel and study team have engaged in a wide range of 
research and analyses. Because FEMA has been the subject of extensive internal and external 
scrutiny, the study team began by reviewing secondary research.  It also reviewed PKEMRA’s 
statutory requirements and DHS/FEMA’s recent policies and procedures.  The study team’s 
activities in these areas included:   
 
• Reviews of recent reports by the General Accounting Office, DHS Inspector General, and 
the Congressional Research Service; 
• Reviews of PKEMRA preparedness integration and regional office requirements; and 
• Analyses of key FEMA policies and procedures. 
 
Upon completing these activities the study team completed the following primary research: 
 
• Analyses of workforce data from FY 2003 to April 2009 made available by FEMA; 
• Interviews with headquarters and regional officials; 
• Interviews with stakeholder representatives and experts; 
• On-site reviews of three FEMA regional offices (Regions I, III, and VI); 
• An electronic survey of senior officials in all FEMA regional offices; and 
• An online stakeholder dialogue with state-level officials.  
 
 
PANEL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
Based on the research findings, the Panel noted that, while FEMA is making progress toward 
integrating preparedness and building more robust regional offices, there are significant ongoing 
challenges that adversely affect FEMA’s ability to achieve the results mandated by PKEMRA.  
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The Panel has identified four major areas and made seven recommendations to address these 
challenges.  Each recommendation includes specific actions that FEMA should undertake.   
 
FEMA supported the principles and intent of PKEMRA, but implementation has been a long and 
difficult undertaking. Congress’s enactment of PKEMRA expressed the public’s renewed 
commitment to a strong FEMA.  Even prior to its enactment, FEMA leadership was taking steps 
to create a “New FEMA,” and these efforts increased after the statute became law in December 
2006. Once new policies and procedures were developed at the headquarters level, FEMA’s 
regions began implementation by hiring Federal Preparedness Coordinators, developing Annual 
Program Plans, and assuming new grant responsibilities.  As shown in Figure 1, FEMA has been 
engaged in these activities while continuing to meet its ongoing emergency management 
responsibilities for prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery programs.  
  
Figure 1 
FEMA Actions to Date 
 
 
 
 
Based on the many positive steps taken by FEMA to date and described in detail throughout this 
report, the Panel believes that FEMA has established a good foundation for continuing to build a 
more resilient nation through improved preparedness.  Nevertheless, FEMA has yet to define 
specific goals and outcomes that would permit it, Congress, or the public to determine when 
preparedness has been fully integrated into all aspects of FEMA’s work and whether the 
development and ongoing operation of robust regional offices has been achieved.  In the absence 
of these key benchmarks, the Panel has relied on input from FEMA stakeholders and staff, as 
well as its own assessment of the agency’s documented progress, to conclude that the following 
challenges remain:   
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• Incomplete integration of preparedness; 
• Insufficient capacity within FEMA regional offices; 
• Limited partnerships with stakeholders; and 
• Ineffective internal business practices. 
 
Each challenge is discussed in detail in a section below. After summarizing FEMA’s relevant 
actions and their impacts, each section concludes with the Panel’s recommendations for 
improvement.  
 
Challenge I.  Preparedness Is Not Fully Integrated Across FEMA.  
 
Following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, most preparedness functions 
and programs were moved from FEMA and placed in other DHS organizational units.  In 2006, 
PKEMRA directed that most DHS preparedness programs and functions be transferred back to 
FEMA, and that the FEMA Administrator “…integrate FEMA’s emergency preparedness, 
protection, response, recovery, and mitigation responsibilities to confront effectively the 
challenges of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster.”   
 
During PKEMRA implementation, FEMA described its legacy programs as stove-piped, and 
directed preparedness policies and initiatives be integrated across prevention, protection, 
response, and recovery programs for all-hazards.  Beyond the general objective of reducing the 
stove-piping of legacy programs, FEMA has not established a clear vision of preparedness 
integration, nor has it established outcomes and measures related to this objective.  Therefore, 
the Panel was unable to use agency-established standards to evaluate the extent of preparedness 
integration across FEMA.  The Panel did not attempt to develop its own vision and set of 
measures for preparedness integration, not only because it was outside the scope of this project, 
but also because it is critical that the vision and measures are “owned” by FEMA and its 
stakeholders.  In the absence of such benchmarks, the Panel used a series of interviews at 
headquarters and the regions, three regional office site visits, and a survey of senior regional 
officials to assess the level of preparedness integration.  Based upon this research, the Panel 
concluded that preparedness is not yet fully integrated across functional areas in FEMA regional 
offices or at headquarters.   
 
In the past, preparedness was considered a separate and distinct phase of the disaster 
management cycle, most often undertaken with incident response in mind.  In that framework, 
officials, community stakeholders, and individuals might plan ahead, preposition supplies, and 
make arrangements to respond during the initial aftermath of an emergency.  Now, with the 
PKEMRA mandate, a renewed focus on preparedness is expected to build more effective 
national capabilities within each of the traditional “phases” of emergency management, as well 
as for the system as a whole.  To achieve this objective, FEMA’s mission programs should be 
engaging in a cross-organizational process of planning, organizing, training, equipping, 
exercising, and evaluating and improving.  This integrated approach to preparedness will build, 
sustain, and enhance the operational capabilities required for prevention, protection, response, 
and recovery.  
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Among the steps that FEMA has taken to integrate preparedness activities across its mission-
related programs are the following: 
 
• Structural changes at headquarters and the regions to support national preparedness, 
including the establishment of Federal Preparedness Coordinators within each region; 
• Policy and program guidance to implement preparedness integration; 
• Headquarters development of an annual program plan template for regional preparedness 
activities; and 
• Regional development and completion of FY 09 Annual Program Plans for each region’s 
preparedness activities. 
 
Although these are important actions, the Panel has concluded that preparedness is not fully 
integrated across FEMA and other stakeholder groups with preparedness responsibilities.  The 
Panel has identified a number of challenges: 
 
• Continuation of “siloed” mission-related programs: 
o A number of respondents commented on the perceived resistance to preparedness 
integration from other mission-related programs within FEMA regions. 
• Less than 10 percent of regional survey respondents reported that preparedness was fully 
integrated in their region;  
• Almost 80 percent of respondents reported that it would take over a year to fully integrate 
preparedness within their region; 
• Limitations on FEMA’s ability to use existing resources for preparedness activities 
related to statutory restrictions;  
• Absence of a defined set of anticipated outcomes and measures for preparedness 
integration; and 
• Limited monitoring and evaluation by headquarters. 
 
This section discusses FEMA’s concept of integrated preparedness, the National Preparedness 
Guidelines, the National Response Framework and FEMA’s recent organizational changes.  It 
also cites key findings related to preparedness integration from the regional office survey.  It 
concludes with findings and recommendations for how FEMA can address these challenges, thus 
building a more fully integrated system of national preparedness. 
 
FEMA’s Actions to Integrate Preparedness 
 
From October 2006 through February 2008, FEMA working groups completed plans and 
oversaw implementation of the key requirements of PKEMRA, including the transfer of most 
national preparedness programs and staff from elsewhere in DHS to FEMA.  FEMA’s actions 
included the creation of the National Preparedness Directorate within FEMA headquarters and 
the articulation of a concept of preparedness integration.  FEMA acknowledges that preparedness 
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was previously stove-piped as a distinct “phase” of the emergency management process.  As 
shown in Figure 2, it is now to be integrated across prevention, protection, response, and 
recovery. 
 
Figure 2 
FEMA’s Concept of Integrated Preparedness 
 
 
 
Source:  Derived from FEMA’s PowerPoint, “Integrating Regional and National Preparedness through 
FEMA Regions” (May 12, 2008), slide 3. 
 
According to FEMA, preparedness involves a cycle of planning, resource acquisition, training, 
exercising, and evaluating to build, sustain, and improve all operational capabilities. (See Figure 
3.)  One FEMA official noted that planning is the “keystone” of this cycle. 
   
Figure 3 
FEMA’s Preparedness Cycle 
 
 
Source:  Derived from DHS’s National Response Framework.  (September 2007), page 27. 
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In September 2007, DHS released the National Preparedness Guidelines7 based on consultation 
with over 1,500 officials at various levels of government (federal, state, and local) and over 120 
national associations, as well as lessons learned from Katrina and other reviews.  The Guidelines 
were intended to organize and synchronize national preparedness, guide national investments, 
incorporate lessons learned from past disasters, facilitate a capabilities-based and risk-based 
investment planning process, and establish readiness metrics.8   
 
The Guidelines contain four critical elements, discussed below: 
 
1. The National Preparedness Vision is a concise statement of the core preparedness goal for 
the nation: “A nation prepared with coordinated capabilities to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from all hazards in a way that balances risks with resources and 
need.”  
2. The National Planning Scenarios are a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of 
both potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters. They are designed to identify the broad 
spectrum of tasks and capabilities needed for all-hazards preparedness. 
3. The Universal Task List is a menu of approximately 1,600 tasks to facilitate prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery related to the major events identified in the scenarios. It is 
a library and hierarchy of tasks by homeland security mission area. 
4. The Target Capabilities List contains a total of 37 capabilities that communities, the private 
sector, and all levels of government should collectively possess. It is a comprehensive 
catalog of capabilities to perform homeland security missions, including performance 
measures and metrics for common tasks.  
 
Figure 4 shows other key plans and capabilities that are subject to the National Preparedness 
Guidelines.  
                                                 
7 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007). 
8 The National Preparedness Guidelines commit DHS/FEMA and stakeholders at all levels to “focus on special 
needs populations, such as people with disabilities, language and cultural differences, economic barriers, and age-
related issues and concerns.”  This is a response to the PKEMRA mandate, as described by one FEMA official, that 
the agency address special needs populations by, among other things, “develop[ing] procedures for information the 
public of evacuation plans before and during an evacuation, including individuals with disabilities or other special 
needs; with limited English proficiency; or who might otherwise have difficulty in obtaining such information.” 
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Figure 4 
Key Plans and Capabilities Subject to the National Preparedness Guidelines 
 
 
 
Source:  Derived from DHS’s National Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007), page 2. 
 
The Guidelines establish a capabilities-based perspective for preparedness across the full range 
of homeland security missions, from prevention through recovery.  DHS defines a capability as 
“the means to accomplish a mission.”  Figure 5 shows the preparedness capabilities articulated 
for five major mission areas (prevention; protection; response; recovery; and common, or cross-
cutting).  
 14
Figure 5 
National Preparedness Capabilities  
 
 
 
Source: Derived from DHS’s National Preparedness Guidelines (September 2007), pages 42-43. 
 
In January 2008, DHS released the National Response Framework9 after consulting with 
practitioners and policymakers at all levels.  The Framework is important within the context of 
this study because it identifies the emergency management responsibilities of stakeholders at the 
national, state and local level.   
 
The Framework sets forth five principles that are key to effective emergency response: 
 
1. Engaged partnership—leadership and partnerships at all levels are essential to 
preparedness. Effective response activities begin with a host of preparedness activities 
conducted long before an actual incident.  
2. Tiered response—incidents are managed at the lowest possible jurisdictional level, with 
support from additional capabilities when needed. It is not necessary that a level be 
overwhelmed prior to requesting resources from another level. 
3. Scalable, flexible, and adaptable operational capabilities—response must adapt to meet 
new requirements as incidents change in size, scope, and complexity.  
                                                 
9 Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (January 2008). 
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4. Unity of effort through unified command—the chain of command of each participating 
organization is respected, while harnessing seamless coordination across jurisdictions in 
support of common objectives. This is indispensable to response activities and requires a 
clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each participating organization.   
5. Readiness to act—effective response requires readiness to act balanced with an 
understanding of risk. Once response activities have begun, on-scene actions are based on 
National Incident Management System principles. Acting swiftly and effectively requires 
clear, focused communication and supporting processes.  
 
According to the Framework, stakeholders at all levels have responsibility for preparedness 
activities related to response.  As shown in Figure 6, the responsibility for incident response 
begins at the local level with the individuals and public officials in the county, city, or town 
directly affected by the incident.  The state government’s primary role is to supplement and 
facilitate local efforts before, during, and after incidents.  The state provides direct and routine 
assistance to its local jurisdictions through emergency management program development and by 
routinely coordinating in these efforts with federal officials.  The federal government becomes 
involved when an incident (1) occurs that exceeds or is anticipated to exceed local or state 
resources or (2) involves a federal asset, such as a federal building.  Private sector and non-
governmental organizations play key roles before, during, and after an incident. Businesses and 
emergency managers work together to provide water, power, communication networks, 
transportation, medical care, security, and other services during the response and recovery 
phases.  
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Figure 6 
Responsibilities within the National Emergency Management System 
National Response Framework 
 
 
 
Source:  Derived from DHS’s National Response Framework (January 2008), pages 5-17. 
 
In 2007, FEMA also made organizational structure changes to address issues related to 
preparedness and preparedness integration.  The National Preparedness (NP) Directorate was 
established within FEMA, and is led by a Deputy Administrator, who is a Presidential Appointee 
subject to Senate Confirmation. Within the NP Directorate, FEMA has established a new 
National Integration Center.   
 
As shown in Figure 7, the permanent full-time (PFT) workforce assigned to the National 
Preparedness Directorate has moved up and down over this period, as preparedness resources 
shifted between FEMA and the DHS Directorate of Preparedness.  The six-year trend, however, 
is clear: the National Preparedness Directorate PFT workforce has increased more than three-fold 
between FY 2003 and April 2009 (from 59 to 260).   
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Figure 7 
National Preparedness Directorate PFT Workforce10  
FY 2003 – April 2009 
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Source:  FEMA Workforce Data, FY 2003 (April 2009) 
 
 
In addition, FEMA made organizational structure changes in the regions in order to better 
address preparedness requirements. FEMA established a uniform regional preparedness 
structure, as shown in Figure 8, to ensure consistency in roles and responsibilities across the 
regions. 
 
                                                 
10 This data includes all headquarters NPD employees categorized by FEMA’s FY 2003 to April 2009 Employee 
Count Spreadsheet as “PFT” and “SES-Career.”     
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Figure 8 
Uniform Regional Preparedness Organizational Structure 
 
 
 
Source:  Derived from FEMA’s PowerPoint entitled “Integrating Regional and National Preparedness 
through FEMA Regions” (May 12, 2008), slide 15. 
 
The Panel was unable to conduct a workforce level analysis of the permanent full-time 
preparedness workforce in the FEMA regions from FY 2003 to April 2009 because only 
aggregate data on the regional workforce was available for these years; information about the 
number of employees in each directorate or division could not be provided.  Since the enactment 
of PKEMRA in October 2006, however, the Panel is aware that FEMA has filled a number of the 
key preparedness positions in its regional offices: 
 
• A Federal Preparedness Coordinator (FPC) has been established in each regional 
office to manage, strengthen, and integrate regional preparedness efforts across federal, 
state, and local levels, as well as across jurisdictional and bureaucratic boundaries.  The 
FPC is a GS-15 position intended to promote the integration and synchronization of 
preparedness activities across Regional stakeholders.  These individuals actively facilitate 
collaborative events with stakeholders and partners such as educational forums, 
workshops, training, and exercises.  
• A Preparedness Analysis and Planning Officer has been established in each region to 
support the Federal Preparedness Coordinator in fulfilling broad national preparedness 
responsibilities.  This is a GS-13/14 level position to serve as the critical link between the 
operational planning and administrative activities at the regional office and the 
preparedness initiatives of the National Preparedness Directorate.   
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• Grants Management Specialists (a total of 20 throughout the regions) have been added 
within the regional offices to support the business management of federal preparedness 
assistance program activities in the region by developing, delivering, and maintaining a 
variety of support activities related to the business administration of grants and 
cooperative agreements.11 
• Training and Exercise Specialists (a total of 20 throughout the regions) have been 
added within the regional offices to work in partnership with Regional Training 
Managers to coordinate training and exercise requirements across the Regional Offices. 
 
In June 2008, FEMA headquarters released a template for the Annual Program Plans (APP) to be 
completed by the FPC in each region.  The APP template serves as a guide for FPCs in 
identifying plans, activities, resource gaps, and success measures across ten preparedness areas: 
 
• Planning and Continuity Capabilities; 
• Exercises; 
• National Incident Management System; 
• Training; 
• Transition Planning; 
• Citizen Corps and Community Preparedness; 
• Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program; 
• Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program; 
• Assessments; and 
• Capabilities Development. 
 
The National Academy review found that the 2008 Annual Program Plans created by the 
regional offices were solid efforts, and the regions have committed to a wide range of 
preparedness activities.  Some regions identified preparedness program areas in addition to the 
ten standard ones.  The depth and breadth of planned activities varied by region, with some 
planning more activities than others.  Each preparedness area identified by headquarters except 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program was deemed applicable in every region.12   
 
Based on the activities identified in the Annual Program Plans, the FEMA regions have a 
significant role in facilitating interactions between key stakeholders through planning, training, 
workshops, and reviews of state/local/tribal plans.  As shown in Table 2, many of the challenges 
identified by the regions in their Annual Program Plans are related to insufficient staffing and 
budget for their preparedness responsibilities.  Moreover, some regions expressed concerns about 
their capabilities, as well as the need for headquarters to finalize various policies/plans and to set 
more realistic expectations. 
                                                 
11 In comments on the agency review draft, a FEMA reviewer reported that “an additional 10 CORE Grants 
Management Specialist positions were approved in September 2009 and are being sent to the regions.”   
12 Only half of the regions have responsibilities for chemical stockpile emergency preparedness. 
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Table 2 
Planned Regional Activities/Challenges in Select Preparedness Areas 
Analysis of FY 2009 Annual Program Plans 
 
Area Activities Identified Regional Challenges 
Planning and 
Continuity 
Capabilities 
• Review and approval of preparedness 
grant applications 
• Monitor grants 
• Analyze preparedness/readiness plans 
• Partner with stakeholders 
• Working group meetings on catastrophic 
planning 
• Preparedness exercises 
• Conduct regional capability assessment 
• Weak planning in preparedness cycle 
• Unclear roles and responsibilities for Regional 
Catastrophic Planning Grant 
Exercises 
• National conferences 
• Regional workshops 
• Participation in exercises, evaluations, and 
after-action reviews 
• Review of state Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and Concept of Operations 
Plan (CONPLANS) documents 
• Exercise planning assistance to states 
• Need bi-lingual materials 
• National Exercise Division (NED) should let 
regions approve applications 
• Need improvements to development and delivery 
of National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) compliance courses to improve conduct 
of exercises 
• Need more post-exercise support and Homeland 
Security Exercise and Evaluation Program 
(HSEEP) needs specific federal Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) templates and guidance 
• The number of requests for FEMA regional 
participation in exercises far exceeds time and 
staff. 
Training  
• National Training and Exercise 
Conference 
• Regional Training and Exercise 
Conference and other workshops. 
• Course reviews and updates 
• Publication of Regional Training and 
Exercise Plan 
• Identification of regional gaps through 
visits to state offices 
• Revise and enhance new employee 
orientation 
• Emergency Management Institute’s (EMI) 
management of FEMA training and 
development needs 
• EMI delivery of training courses 
• Regions do not fully control training programs, 
though this cannot be developed to any great 
extent without additional staffing and funding in 
the regional training office. 
• Need bilingual course materials for full 
participation in Puerto Rico training events. 
• Low regional funding allocation for employee 
development. 
• Procedures should be revised to more accurately 
reflect regional goals and objectives within the 
program area. 
• Disaster reserve workforce is a second priority to 
external customers in training programs 
• Minimal resources dedicated to training FEMA 
full time employees 
 21
Area Activities Identified Regional Challenges 
Assessments 
• All-hazards-gap analysis 
• Review of state preparedness reports 
• Threat assessment reviews 
• Joint FEMA-state implementation plans to 
respond to identifies gaps 
• Technical assistance 
• Grants Monitoring 
• Assessment of cadre readiness 
• Identify training shortfalls 
• FEMA needs to develop a strategy to establish an 
All-Hazards Assessment and Information 
repository at HQ or the regions to identify gaps. 
• Region and HQ need to reduce burden on states 
and ensure assessments-requirements are 
coordinated among FEMA divisions and the 
federal sector. 
• New documents coming from FEMA HQ 
typically have a short review and comment 
period, and adherence is often required prior to 
finalization. 
• Funding and human resource gaps in several 
regions. 
Capabilities 
Development 
• Work related to the Integrated Planning 
System 
• Flu planning workshops 
• Target Capabilities List initiatives and 
workshops 
• Gap analyses and technical assistance 
• Develop regional safety policy 
• Ensure that Federal Preparedness 
Coordinators (FPC) and other officials 
become experts on the planning doctrine. 
• FEMA needs to develop a national flu plan with 
coordination between National Continuity 
Programs (NCP) Directorate and Department of 
Defense 
• Regions need to have their Preparedness 
Analysis and Planning Specialist on board by the 
first quarter of the FY, otherwise their ability to 
develop capabilities are significantly impaired. 
• Regions lack sufficient technical expertise in 
geospatial analysis, mapping and risk 
assessments.  
 
In April 2009, the National Academy developed a survey of senior regional officials to obtain 
their input on questions related to five issues:  
 
1. Robust regional offices;  
2. Preparedness integration;  
3. Stakeholder relationships;  
4. Regional-headquarters relationship; and 
5. Recommendations to improve preparedness.13   
 
As shown in Figure 9, three-quarters of regional survey respondents reported that their region 
has made some progress in integrating preparedness.  Nearly 80 percent, however, reported it 
would take more than a year to fully integrate preparedness into every area.  Over 70 percent of 
respondents reported that preparedness in their functional area was “somewhat integrated.”  Only 
                                                 
13 FEMA headquarters distributed the survey electronically to approximately 70 officials who were in the following 
positions: Regional Administrator; Deputy Regional Administrator; Federal Preparedness Coordinator; Director, 
Management Division; Director, Disaster Assistance Division; Director, Disaster Operations Division; and Director, 
Mitigation Division.  Some of these individuals were in acting positions.  FEMA headquarters sent participants a 
National Academy email explaining the purpose of the survey, ensuring confidentiality of data, and a link to open 
the survey.  At least one response was received from 7 of the 10 regions.  A full 70% of the Federal Preparedness 
Coordinators responded, resulting in strong input on the preparedness integration questions.  In total, 26 officials 
responded, which was a response rate of 37% across all the senior officials.   
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Comments from the  
FEMA Regional Office Survey 
1. “The legacy generation of 
FEMA need(s) to step back a 
little and develop an 
appreciation for what a 
robust preparedness 
program can do for FEMA 
and its partners.” 
 
2. “Make the new 
Preparedness vision match 
reality …” 
 
3. “Define a clear mission and 
vision for preparedness.” 
 
(Survey April 2009) 
one respondent reported that it was “fully integrated,” and no one reported that it was “not at all 
integrated.”  
 
Figure 9 
Level of Reported Integration of Preparedness 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
(N = 24) 
4%
13%
75%
8%
Fully Integrated Close to Fully Somewhat Integrated Not Very Integrated
 
Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
Despite this reported progress, the study team’s research and site visits found that Federal 
Preparedness Coordinators are encountering resistance to preparedness integration efforts.  The 
resistance appears to stem from the perceived burden of the other 
responsibilities facing mission programs, continued organizational 
barriers between mission programs, and differences between the 
homeland security culture and the emergency management 
culture.    
 
In the regional office survey, the most frequently recommended 
action to improve preparedness was to establish a vision for 
preparedness integration and to increase commitment to this goal.   
 
Respondents were asked how long they think it will take to 
achieve preparedness integration in their respective regions.  As 
shown in Figure 10, nearly 8 in 10 respondents (79 percent) 
reported that it would take over a year; 12 percent of respondents 
believe preparedness integration will take one year to achieve; 4 
percent said it would take six months; and 4.2 percent said they do 
not know.  No one said preparedness integration is unachievable.   
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Figure 10 
How Long Will It Take for Preparedness to Be Integrated? 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
(N = 24) 
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Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
Respondents were also asked to identify specific challenges or barriers they had experienced in 
trying to integrate preparedness.  As Table 3 shows, the respondents identified challenges in 14 
major areas. 
 
Table 3 
Regional Views of Preparedness Integration Challenges 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
 
Rank Challenge Area  Responses (#) 
1. Internal resistance to preparedness integration (PI) across 
FEMA divisions; problematic restrictions on use of certain 
types of personnel.  
17 
2. Staffing levels viewed as inadequate to perform needed PI 
tasks. 
9 
3. Stakeholders need to be more actively engaged, but recognize 
that stakeholder capabilities limited. 
5 
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Rank Challenge Area  Responses (#) 
4. 
(TIED) 
 
FEMA headquarters/regional office relationship needs to be 
improved.   
4 
 Regions are closer to grantees and should be authorized to 
make programmatic decisions on preparedness grants. 
4 
 Increased responsibilities for regions require improving staff 
capabilities in specific areas. 
4 
 Increased responsibilities and expectations for regions require 
additional regional authorities. 
4 
8. 
(TIED) 
FEMA hiring processes too lengthy and inefficient.   2 
 FEMA/Department of Homeland Security Relationship within 
regions must be improved.   
2 
10. 
(TIED) 
Regional budget and financial authorities need to be 
established. 
1 
 Meaningful performance goals and accountabilities need to be 
established.  
1 
 Senior leadership commitment needed to support PI. 1 
 Increase availability of training; increase use of exercises. 1 
 Make funds available to support necessary travel. 1 
Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
The following illustrative comments were provided by survey respondents, and provide 
additional context for the top three challenge areas identified in the survey.  
 
1. Internal Resistance to Preparedness Integration and Administrative Challenges 
 
• “All divisions must embrace the preparedness message.” 
• “[Preparedness faces] a huge education effort—who we are, what we can offer, our role 
even with other federal agencies as well as states and locals.” 
• “Program development is still stove-piped within single program areas.” 
• “Too much HQ stove-piping of programs” 
• “The National Preparedness Directorate is focused on improving state and local 
capabilities, and not focused on increasing FEMA and federal capabilities.” 
• “National Preparedness Divisions in the regions do not ‘own’ many of the major 
elements of Preparedness.” 
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2. Staffing Levels  
 
• “FEMA HQ needs to increase funding for personnel and programs.” 
• “We have never attained full or adequate staffing [for preparedness].” 
• “Regions do not have staff to integrate/administer programs.” 
 
3. Stakeholders 
 
• “All staff [are] located in the regional office, limiting stakeholder engagement.” 
• “National Preparedness (NP) works with Disaster Operations planners but Disaster 
Operations, Disaster Assistance, and Incident Management Assistance Teams are 
sometimes displeased with NP's disaster response restrictions.” 
• “From a regional perspective, it is critical that we are actively involved in the program 
aspects of the grants, yet the staff for that responsibility is in the Grants Branch of the 
Management Division.  This significantly degrades NP’s capability to monitor and assist 
the state and local governments in meeting their goals.” 
 
Panel Findings and Recommendations 
 
Based on the data and information examined during the course of this study, the Panel concluded 
that FEMA faces key challenges in fully imbuing the new concept of preparedness integration 
across FEMA programs and stakeholder groups, and in utilizing outcome metrics to determine 
whether preparedness strategies and activities are achieving desired objectives.  In addition, 
FEMA faces organizational barriers to preparedness integration, as its main programs still 
operate as though they are independent of one another.   
 
Meeting the PKEMRA mandate to integrate preparedness will require an organizational 
transformation in FEMA. Based on the National Academy’s work on organizational 
transformation in the Coast Guard and other agencies, the Panel believes that to successfully 
integrate preparedness across the agency FEMA will need to: 
 
1. Ensure that top leadership drives the transformation activities; 
2. Establish a clear vision for preparedness integration; 
3. Ensure that the organizational structure enables the vision; 
4. Create a sense of urgency to complete preparedness integration; 
5. Communicate frequently on needs, expectations, and progress through multiple channels 
to multiple stakeholders; 
6. Designate an implementation team to manage the transformation process; 
7. Engage FEMA and stakeholders to seek ideas, build momentum, and gain their 
ownership for the transformation; and 
8. Sustain the effort by nurturing a new culture oriented toward the desired outcomes. 
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RECOMMENDATION 1 
 
 
 
 
The Panel found that FEMA has not established and effectively communicated a shared vision 
for preparedness integration.14  FEMA must describe the agency’s vision for preparedness and 
align the organization and its mission-related programs around this vision.  Through this effort, 
FEMA can foster a culture of preparedness that is understood and shared by all internal and 
external stakeholders.15   
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA establish a collaborative cross-organizational process, 
with participation from internal and external stakeholders, to develop a shared 
understanding of preparedness integration. 
 
To implement this recommendation, FEMA leadership should take the following actions: 
 
• Restate the agency’s commitment to the goal of preparedness integration and identify 
how it will hold itself, headquarters and regional staff accountable for achieving this goal; 
• Engage internal and external stakeholders in the development and promulgation of the 
vision; and 
• Designate an internal Implementation Team for Preparedness Integration to: 
o Monitor progress and report to senior leadership; and 
o Regularly engage internal and external stakeholders to develop common 
understanding of preparedness integration.  
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 2 
 
 
 
 
The Panel found that FEMA does not yet have appropriate outcome measures to determine 
whether its preparedness integration efforts are successful.  The guidance to date is focused on 
process or output measures, and does not describe the desired outcome to be achieved or realized 
as a result of preparedness integration.  While outputs are important, and can indicate the 
completion of a specific activity, clear outcome measures communicate the expected results or 
impacts of those actions.  Outcome metrics will allow FEMA to understand whether the program 
                                                 
14 The Panel notes that definitions for preparedness are found in documents pertaining to the National Incident 
Management System (NIMS) and the National Preparedness Guidelines.  Specified actions for preparedness 
integration are found within the CONOPS and other documents.  However, there is no widely shared understanding 
across all mission program areas of what outcomes need to be achieved through preparedness integration.  
15 According to one FEMA official, “the absence of a formal preparedness requirements definition and analysis 
process (as part of an end-to-end resource allocation system)” is a “systemic problem.”  This means that FEMA 
components often “implement initiatives without adequate preparedness requirements definition and analysis,” 
which causes “preparedness programs, activities, and services [to] lag implementation.”   
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is yielding the necessary benefits for the nation.  Development of relevant outcome measures is 
challenging, but a critical element of FEMA’s transformation.16 
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA establish outcome metrics and standards for 
preparedness integration, as well as a system to monitor and evaluate progress on an 
ongoing basis.  
 
In implementing this recommendation, FEMA should: 
 
• Establish a process to recommend outcome measures for preparedness and preparedness 
integration, utilizing the expertise from FEMA headquarters and regions as well as 
stakeholders from state, local, and tribal levels; 
• Align these outcome measures to the performance standards of units and individuals, as 
appropriate; and 
• Regularly review progress and take corrective action where needed. 
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 3 
 
 
 
 
The Panel found that FEMA has undertaken steps to break down the barriers between and among 
mission program areas, including cross-program collaboration on policy development.17  
However, significant barriers continue to exist that impede the integration of preparedness.  Until 
these organizational barriers are reduced, full integration of preparedness will be difficult to 
achieve.  
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA work to eliminate the organizational barriers that are 
adversely impacting the full integration of preparedness across the agency.  
 
To implement this recommendation, the Implementation Team for Preparedness Integration 
should: 
 
• Convene mission program directorates to identify the actions needed to reduce the 
negative effects18 of continued stove-piping among directorates and programs, at 
                                                 
16 One FEMA official noted that an impediment to identifying outcomes has been the absence of operational plans 
and the fact that the Integrated Planning System (IPS) is in its early stages of implementation.  In comments on the 
agency review draft, a FEMA reviewer noted that the agency’s National Continuity Programs Directorate (NCP) has 
developed Regional Continuity Metrics (FEMA CORE Competencies with Performance Metrics for Regions).  The 
National Continuity Programs Directorate (NCP) is conducting on-site Continuity assessments of all ten Regions.  
The assessments review the Region’s ability to activate, mobilize, and perform primary mission essential functions 
during any emergency or situation that may disrupt normal operations, as addressed in the Region’s continuity plan.   
17 Other reported cross-organizational efforts include the PKREMRA directed comprehensive assessment tool and 
implementation planning for the Integrated Planning System.   
18 One FEMA official reported that the “impact of ‘stove-piping’ is more a function of not inviting preparedness 
staffs at HQ or the regions to assist … in the requirements definition and analysis process,” which is one reason 
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headquarters as well as regional offices, and commit to establishing a more cooperative 
and collaborative means of operating. 
• Identify any statutory or policy restrictions that prevent FEMA’s mission directorates 
from working together to accomplish preparedness integration, and make 
recommendations to FEMA leadership to modify the policies or ameliorate the impacts. 
 
Challenge II.  Insufficient Capacity in FEMA Regional Offices 
 
The FEMA regional offices are the critical points of interface with non-federal stakeholders who 
have primary responsibility for emergency management, including preparedness.  Under 
PKEMRA, the regional offices have been given greater responsibility for implementing FEMA’s 
emergency management programs. State and local governments use FEMA programs to build 
capacity through training, planning and equipment grants, exercises, and technical assistance.  
Regional offices are FEMA’s front line in supporting these stakeholders. Indeed, FEMA’s 
CONOPS document designated the regions as “the principal conduit for delivery of all 
preparedness programs and activities to state, tribal, and local partners, non-governmental 
organizations, the private sector, and citizens.” 
 
Congress’s mandate in the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA) that 
FEMA develop “robust” regional offices reflected its determination that these organizational 
units did not have the capabilities needed to perform their expected role in the nation’s 
preparedness system.  Although FEMA has not yet articulated a definition of “robust regional 
offices” or developed a framework with a set of metrics to assess this goal across all aspects of 
emergency management, the Panel believes that fully robust regional offices at a minimum 
would have the following general characteristics: 
 
• Sufficient capacity to support stakeholders at the state, local, and tribal levels; 
• Optimally sized workforce with the requisite skills to implement headquarters policies 
and guidance; 
• Strong working relationships with headquarters components; and 
• Strong working relationships with stakeholders at the state, local, and tribal levels. 
 
The Panel assessed current “robustness” through a combination of in-person interviews, visits to 
three regional offices, a regional office survey, a state-level stakeholder dialogue, and workforce 
analyses.  This review found that FEMA has taken significant steps to strengthen its regional 
offices, including: 
 
• Developed and promulgated guidance to identify the preparedness responsibilities of 
headquarters and the regional offices; 
• Implemented a uniform organizational structure across all ten regional offices; 
                                                                                                                                                             
FEMA “placed a ‘preparedness estimate’ process in Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 101” (released in March 
2009). 
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• Created new national preparedness and grants management units in each region; 
• Revised reporting relationships to strengthen the accountability of regional 
administrators; 
• Increased headquarters-regional office interactions; 
• Allocated additional permanent full-time positions to each of the ten regions, and 
increased the grade for permanent full-time Regional Continuity Managers’ positions in 
each region to GS 13/14;  
• Created ten Regional-State Continuity Working Groups within each region, with 
quarterly meetings;19  
• Created a regional advisory council in each of the ten regions to represent stakeholders; 
and 
• Delegated ten additional authorities to regional administrators, pursuant to a July 2009 
memorandum from the Administrator.  
 
FEMA has also made progress in improving headquarters/regional office relations and has begun 
to expand the capacity of regional offices by increasing their workforce and decentralizing 
certain authorities.  However, the FEMA regional offices identified a number of areas where 
improvements are still needed: 
 
• Over 90 percent of the regional survey respondents reported that moderate or 
considerable change was still needed to become fully robust; 
• The actions most often mentioned by regional survey respondents as necessary for 
regions to become fully robust were: 
o Increased personnel; 
o More active stakeholder engagement; 
o Increased staff capabilities; and 
o Increased regional authority. 
• At the time of the site visits and survey, regional offices reported serious delays in 
receiving the paperwork from headquarters required to meet new grants management 
responsibilities; and 
• Regional Administrators reported that they lacked authority over a region-wide budget. 
 
This section provides more detailed information about the steps FEMA has taken thus far to 
enhance the capacity of its regional offices, and concludes with the Panel’s findings and 
recommendations to further strengthen these critical operating units. 
                                                 
19 One FEMA official noted that the agency also hosts an annual Continuity of Operations Strategic Planning 
Conference for States, Territories, and the District of Columbia.    
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FEMA’s Actions to Build Robust Regional Offices 
 
In 2007, FEMA began its effort to enhance the capabilities of regional offices by reviewing the 
organizational structures that had evolved in each of its ten regional offices.  As a result of that 
review, FEMA established and has implemented a new uniform regional structure that includes a 
National Preparedness Division, as shown in Figure 11.  This division has two branches: 
Regional Integration and Technological Hazards. 
 
Figure 11 
New Uniform FEMA Regional Structure 
FY 2008 
 
 
 
Source:  FEMA’s PowerPoint entitled “Integrating Regional and National Preparedness through 
FEMA Regions” (May 12, 2008), slide 16. 
 
In February 2008, FEMA’s CONOPS that established a basic division of responsibilities 
between headquarters and the regions.  Headquarters establishes policy and provides program 
guidance to set the national agenda, while the regions are responsible for implementing the 
policies and programs. In addition, the CONOPS designates regions as responsible for assisting 
states and urban areas in developing and implementing preparedness strategies, and headquarters 
provides assistance to regional offices faced with complex, high profile activities.  Figure 12 
shows the CONOPS’ depiction of the distribution of responsibility between headquarters and the 
regions. 
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Figure 12 
CONOPS’ Distribution of Responsibility between Headquarters and the Regions 
 
 
 
Source:  FEMA’s Regional-National Preparedness Concept of Operations (February 8, 2008), page 7. 
 
Survey respondents were asked whether FEMA headquarters and regional offices’ interactions 
had changed as a result of preparedness integration activities.  As shown in Figure 13, the 
majority of respondents (63 percent) reported that their interactions with headquarters have 
increased. Some respondents reported that interactions have not changed (21 percent), or did not 
know (13 percent).  
 
Figure 13 
Reported Level of Headquarters Interaction 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
(N = 24) 
 
13%
4%
21% 63%
Increased Stayed the Same Decreased Don't Know
 
Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
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Respondents were asked how the level of interaction with headquarters reported in the previous 
question had affected regional preparedness.  As shown in Figure 14, the majority reported that it 
had either improved or greatly improved preparedness (58 percent).  Some respondents reported 
that the interaction had no impact on preparedness (29 percent), while 13 percent did not know.   
 
Figure 14 
Impact of HQ-Regional Interaction on Preparedness 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
(N = 24) 
 
4%
54%29%
13%
Greatly Improved Improved No Change Don't Know
 
Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
Because FEMA had not established a definition of what is meant by “robust” regional offices, 
regional survey respondents were asked what a robust regional office meant to them.  Based on 
the responses, the Panel identified three key characteristics of robust regional offices: 
 
• Appropriate levels of authority 
o General decision-making 
o Grant-making 
o Regional budget 
• Adequate human capital  
o Number of employees 
o Skilled, experienced staff 
• Strong partnerships 
o Headquarters 
o Stakeholders 
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Even these characteristics, however, represent inputs and outputs, rather than outcome measures 
that could be used to determine whether the goal of having robust regional offices has been 
achieved.  
 
In response to a question about how much change was required for their regional office to 
become fully robust, all respondents agreed that changes were needed to achieve this goal.  As 
shown in Figure 15, over 70 percent believed that a considerable amount of change (59 percent) 
or a moderate amount (33 percent) was required.  Less than 10 percent said that drastic changes 
would be required.  
 
 
Figure 15 
Reported Level of Change Required to Become “Fully Robust” 
Regional Office Survey, April 2009 
(N = 24) 
 
8%
58%
33%
Moderate Amount Considerable Amount Drastic Changes
 
Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
In response to questions about their major challenges, regional survey respondents routinely 
cited lack of sufficient staff.  Further, a considerable number of respondents said they did not 
have enough people in their region or program area with the right skill set.  As shown in Figure 
16, the permanent full-time (PFT) regional workforce increased by 40 percent (427 PFT 
positions) between FY 2003 and FY 2009.  By comparison, the PFT workforce at FEMA 
headquarters increased by 72 percent (1,031 PFT positions) over the same period.  Given the 
centrality of the regions described in FEMA’s Concept of Operations and PKEMRA’s 
expectations, FEMA may want to consider shifting some headquarters resources to regional 
offices.  
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Figure 16 
Number of Permanent Full-Time FEMA Regional Office and Headquarters Employees 
FY 2003 – April 2009 
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 Apr. 09
HQ PFT Regional PFT
 
Source:  FEMA Workforce Data, FY 2003 (April 2009) 
 
Recent Policy Changes 
 
During the summer of 2009, the new Administrator ordered an internal agency review to 
determine whether additional authorities should be transferred to the regional offices.  His goal 
was to “significantly enhance and solidify regional authorities” to improve FEMA’s service to 
state, local, and tribal governments.  Of the thirteen authorities identified for possible transfer 
from headquarters to the regions, the Administrator directed that ten be delegated to the 
regions:20   
 
• Approval for mission assignments of $25 million or more to expedite regional disaster 
assistance to state and local governments; 
• Contracting for airlifts; 
• Ability to add counties to a major disaster declaration already approved by the President; 
• Approval of dual lodging costs during disasters; 
• Approval of FEMA Form 40-1 “Requisition and Commitment for Services and Supplies” 
for non-disaster acquisitions; 
                                                 
20 Memorandum from the FEMA Administrator to Delegate Authorities to Regional Administrators (July 21, 2009). 
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• Determination of the annual grants monitoring requirements and schedule; 
• Post-award fiscal oversight of grantees for additional grant programs;21 
• Oversight of the Regional Exercise Support Program; 
• Selection and approval of individuals for GS-15 positions; and 
• Review and approval of funding for state administrative costs for the Public Assistance 
and Hazard Mitigation Grant Program. 
 
FEMA headquarters is continuing to review the possible transfer of two additional authorities to 
the regions: (1) ordering supplies directly from FEMA warehouses in the region; (2) approval of 
Fire Management Assistance Grants.  The Administrator decided not to give regions the 
authority to make additional FEMA programs available in a declared disaster area because there 
did not appear to be sufficient need for such a delegation. 
 
Panel Findings and Recommendations 
 
The Panel notes that in recent months FEMA has demonstrated new commitment to the 
PKEMRA mandate of robust regional offices.  The Panel supports recent actions by FEMA 
leadership to delegate more authority to the regions as an important first step.  The Panel is 
concerned that the capacity of the regions to accept additional authorities and responsibilities 
may be compromised by the size and capabilities of their workforce.  FEMA headquarters will 
need to carefully assess progress and performance of the regions.  Based upon this continued 
monitoring, headquarters should determine whether the regions need additional resources to 
support their increased responsibilities.   
 
As robust regions become a reality, the Panel recognizes the importance of a strong and active 
headquarters function. FEMA headquarters has the lead responsibility for relating to Congress 
and national-level stakeholders, assuring agency-wide mission-support functions such as 
managing agency-wide budgets and accountability metrics, developing strategic plans, and 
conducting evaluation and assessments including policy changes based upon lessons learned. In 
addition, requirements within PKEMRA direct FEMA headquarters to develop more robust 
national and regional disaster response teams and capabilities to provide the critical support 
needed to help state, local, and tribal governments respond to disasters.   
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 4 
 
 
 
 
The Panel found that the development of robust regions, as mandated by PKEMRA, is essential 
to FEMA’s ability to achieve its mission.  In the Panel’s view, fully robust regional offices 
would have the following key attributes:   
 
                                                 
21 These grant programs are the Driver’s License Security Grant Program, Emergency Management Performance Grant, 
Emergency Operations Center Grant Program, and Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant Program. 
 36
 
• Sufficient capacity to support stakeholders at the state, local, and tribal levels; 
• An optimally sized workforce with the requisite skills to implement headquarters policies 
and guidance; 
• Strong working relationships with headquarters components; 
• Strong working relationships with stakeholders at the state, local, and tribal levels; 
 
Headquarters should encourage regions to be incubators of innovation in approaches to 
stakeholder engagement and regional management.  Regions should also be viewed as a place 
where current and future agency leaders are nurtured. 
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA continue to build regional capacity and monitor 
implementation actions consistent with the Administrator’s recent policy guidance. 
  
To implement this recommendation, FEMA should establish an Implementation Team for robust 
regional offices to: 
 
• Determine if transfer of additional authorities to the regional offices is warranted; 
• Develop and recommend a framework for evaluating how successful the agency is in 
building robust regional offices; and 
• Recommend outcome metrics to assess regional office performance. 
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 5 
 
 
 
 
Strengthening and improving the headquarters-regional office relationship is central to achieving 
FEMA’s mission. Based upon site visits and interviews, as well headquarters observations, the 
Panel found that the existing relationship between headquarters and the regional offices is not as 
effective as it needs to be to achieve the nation’s preparedness goals.  Although positive steps 
have recently been taken in delegating certain requested authorities to the regions, additional 
engagement between headquarters and the regions is required.  This engagement should be 
developed with the goal of building an effective partnership between the regions and 
headquarters that is based upon mutual cooperation, ongoing involvement and communications 
and supportive leadership at all levels.   
 
The dynamics between a central “hub” and “spokes” are complex and, whether in government or 
the private sector, are typically challenging.  Thoughtful attention must be paid to ensuring these 
relationships function optimally, and their effectiveness should be regularly monitored.  Based 
upon recent research conducted on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,22 the Panel offers 
                                                 
22 Working Relationships in the National Superfund Program: The State Administrators’... 
Cline J Public Adm Res Theory.2008; 0: mun023v1-mun023. 
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a number of attributes and elements in the table below that may help guide FEMA as it works to 
build more effective headquarters and regional office relationships.    
 
Table 4 
Suggested Attributes and Elements to Improve Headquarters-Regional Office Relations 
 
These attributes are equally applicable to building and maintaining strong relationships between 
FEMA and its stakeholders, particularly as FEMA moves forward in creating an effective system 
of national preparedness.   
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA’s senior leadership undertake steps to improve the 
ongoing working relationship between headquarters and the regions in accord with the 
attributes and elements identified above. 
 
To implement this recommendation, FEMA should: 
 
• Build agency-wide understanding and appreciation of the roles and functions of both 
headquarters and the regions by: 
o Establishing a rotational program of temporary details between HQ and the 
regional offices, as well as among the regional offices, themselves; and 
o For SES and GS-15 positions, give preference to candidates who have experience 
at both the regional and headquarters levels. 
Attribute Elements 
Cooperation 
• Accountability 
• Behavior exhibits respect as a partner 
• Ongoing information sharing 
• Reasonable requests/ deadlines 
• Mutual understanding of role 
• Valuing good ideas 
• Mutual commitment to mission 
Ongoing Involvement & 
Communication 
• Ongoing two-way communication 
• Regular two-way feedback 
• Dialogue valued and desired 
• Value skills/expertise across all FEMA levels 
• Respect expertise/experience 
Supportive Leadership 
• Demonstrated commitment to the partnership 
• Recognition of the roles of headquarters and the regional 
offices 
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• Incorporate regional expertise in task forces and working groups to include the 
perspective of the implementing entity and ensure consideration of practical and feasible 
policy alternatives. 
• Develop appropriate mission, organization, and staffing for the Office of Regional 
Operations to ensure it is able to effectively carry out the following duties: 
o Serve as an advocate for the development of robust regional offices; 
o Consider the regional implications of headquarters policy discussions;  and 
o Work collaboratively across FEMA to solve problems facing the regions.   
• Provide regions with timely feedback on the status of submitted materials and requests. 
• Recognize and build upon regional topical expertise, such as wildfire management, 
hurricane preparedness, response and recovery, earthquakes and floods. 
o Provide temporary details for headquarters and regional staff to select regions to 
expand agency-wide expertise. 
 
Challenge III.  Limited Partnerships with Stakeholders 
 
While reviewing FEMA’s actions to integrate preparedness and build robust regional offices, the 
Panel identified stakeholder engagement as a critical cross-cutting issue.  FEMA has taken steps 
and made progress in increasing stakeholder engagement.  Stakeholders include state, local and 
tribal government offices and officials, first responders, other members of the emergency 
management community, businesses and non-governmental organizations and citizens.23  Each 
stakeholder group has a critical role within the national preparedness system, as well as an 
investment and interest in the successful performance of the system.   
 
This section describes in more detail the following key steps that FEMA has taken to engage 
stakeholders: 
 
• Established the National Advisory Council, developed its mission statement and now 
holds regularly scheduled meetings; 
• Established Regional Advisory Councils; 
• Engaged national stakeholders during development of the National Response Framework 
and the National Preparedness Guidelines; 
• Increased stakeholder engagement by regional offices, particularly with state 
governments and private business; 
• Included a broader range of stakeholders in national and regional exercises;  
• Expanded preparedness activities to reach stakeholders through: 
o Technical assistance; 
                                                 
23 In this document, when reporting on survey and interview results, the term stakeholder reflects the view of the 
respondents themselves with regard to who and what groups are stakeholders. The terms “stakeholders” and 
“stakeholder groups” are sometimes used by FEMA to denote “partners” or “target audiences” for FEMA programs.  
The Panel concurs with comments on the agency review draft that the term stakeholder should be more clearly and 
consistently defined and used by FEMA.  
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o State level gap analyses; 
o Expanded communication and information-sharing; 
o Joint exercises, including the provision of “table-top” continuity templates and 
exercises; 
o Training; and 
o Major preparedness grants.  
• Reached more citizens through the Citizen’s Corps and Ready.gov programs.  
 
While FEMA has made progress in stakeholder engagement, the Panel believes that further 
improvements can be made and notes the following challenges in this area: 
 
• Variability in Regional Advisory Councils;  
• Limited increase in regional engagement with local, tribal, and non-governmental 
stakeholders; 
• Public misunderstanding of FEMA’s role;  
• Public reluctance to assume responsibility for their own preparedness; and 
• Limited stakeholder capacity in some instances. 
 
This section concludes with findings and recommendations for how FEMA can address these 
challenges and develop stronger partnerships with the array of stakeholders that are necessary to 
build and maintain a resilient national preparedness system. 
 
FEMA’s Actions to Engage Stakeholders and the General Public 
 
Pursuant to PKEMRA, FEMA has established a National Advisory Council (NAC) and ten 
Regional Advisory Councils (RAC).  PKEMRA mandated that the NAC advise the 
Administrator “on all aspects of emergency management” and required FEMA to “incorporate 
state, local, and tribal government and private sector input in development and revision of 
national preparedness goals, the national preparedness system, the National Incident 
Management System, the National Response Plan, and other related plans and strategies.”  
PKEMRA also directed that each RAC advise the Regional Administrators on “emergency 
management issues specific to that region.”  FEMA headquarters developed mission statements 
for the NAC and the RACs that are consistent with the statutory requirements, and has selected 
members to serve on these councils.  
 
In June 2008 testimony to Congress, GAO’s Director for Homeland Security and Justice said 
that DHS and FEMA need to improve their integration of stakeholders in the revision of key 
policy documents such as the National Response Framework.  When developing the Framework, 
DHS “did not provide the first full revision draft to non-federal stakeholders for their comments 
and suggestions before conducting a closed, internal federal review of the draft.”  GAO 
recommended that the FEMA Administrator “develop and disseminate policies and procedures 
describing the conditions and time frames under which the next NRF revision will occur and 
how FEMA will conduct the next NRF revision.”  These policies should describe how the 
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agency will “integrate all stakeholders … into the revision process and the methods for 
communicating to these stakeholders.”  FEMA agreed with GAO’s recommendation.24 
 
In addition to engaging with organized stakeholder groups, FEMA reaches out to the general 
public for involvement in both preparedness and response activities through several initiatives 
including Ready.gov and the Citizen Corps.  Ready.gov serves to inform the public on how to be 
prepared to respond to disaster.  Individuals are urged to be ready for disasters by creating a plan 
based on the needs of their own household and local communities.  FEMA uses its grassroots 
organization, Citizen Corps, to emphasize the importance of readiness at the individual level and 
to volunteer in emergency relief efforts and community safety, and to “bring together 
government and community leaders to involve citizens in all-hazards emergency preparedness 
and resilience.”  
 
As part of its general engagement with citizens, FEMA has been taking steps to incorporate 
social media into its operations. For example, it was the first federal agency to negotiate an 
agreement with the video-sharing website YouTube.  In January 2009, FEMA’s Administrator 
held a press conference on Twitter.  FEMA also creates podcasts for use on computers, iPods, 
and phones.  FEMA recognizes that collaborating with citizens can help "manage expectations" 
of what FEMA can do in an emergency and encourage Americans to be more prepared in the 
event of a disaster.  
 
As shown in Figure 17, many regional office survey respondents reported an increase in their 
interactions with stakeholders.  Most respondents reported an increase in interaction with states 
(76 percent) and businesses (56 percent).  While over 30 percent of respondents said interation 
with local governments had increased, most said that their interaction had remained the same.  44 
percent of respondents reported that their interaction with non-profit organizations had increased, 
while 40 percent said it had stayed the same.  With respect to interaction with tribal 
governments, the most common response (38 percent) was that it had remained the same, while 
29 percent of respondents reported increased interaction and 27 percent reported that they did not 
know or could not answer.  
 
                                                 
24 Government Accountability Office, Emergency Management: Observations on DHS’s Preparedness for 
Catastrophic Disasters (GAO-08-868T), pp. 8 – 9.   
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Figure 17 
Reported Level of Regional Interaction with Stakeholders 
Regional Office Survey25 
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Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
 
Survey participants were also asked how the level of interaction with stakeholders has affected 
the preparedness of those stakeholder groups, including state, local, tribal, businesses and non-
profit and non-governmental organizations.  Figure 18 shows that nearly 8 in 10 respondents (79 
percent) reported that states’ preparedness had either improved or greatly improved.  A majority 
of respondents (54 percent) reported that local preparedness had either improved or greatly 
improved; 46 percent reported that businesses’ preparedness had either improved or greatly 
improved; 46 percent reported that non-profits’ preparedness had either improved or greatly 
improved.  Nearly a third (30 percent) said that they were unsure of the impact on preparedness 
on tribal organizations.   
                                                 
25 States (N = 25); locals (N = 24); tribes (N = 24); businesses (N = 25); non-profits (N = 25).  
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Figure 18 
Reported Impact of Interaction with Stakeholders on Preparedness26 
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Source:  National Academy’s FEMA Regional Office Survey (April 2009) 
 
 
Stakeholder Input 
 
As part of its research, the National Academy hosted an online dialogue in July 2009 for state-
level stakeholders to gain their perspective on three key issues: 
 
• How can preparedness be improved? 
• How can partnerships between states and FEMA regional offices be improved? 
• How can stakeholders be more effectively engaged in preparedness? 
 
Participants were able to post ideas and review the responses of other participants, provide 
comments on the responses of others, and indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with 
these ideas.  Through this process, state-level stakeholders identified the following key ideas:  
 
• Empower FEMA Regions to work more effectively with states and others.  FEMA 
should identify regional successes to promulgate best practices engaging states and 
others; decentralize all FEMA/DHS grant authorities to FEMA regions; and devolve 
appropriate decision-making authority to regions to negotiate with State and other 
partners and to resolve issues in a timely manner. 
 
                                                 
26 States (N = 24); Locals (N = 24); Tribal (N = 23); Businesses (N = 24); Non-profits (N = 24) 
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• Improve public awareness.  Government at all levels should target individuals, families, 
and businesses; an emphasis should be placed on individual responsibility as “the 
cornerstone of the emergency management preparedness, response and recovery 
process”; stakeholder outreach efforts such as Citizen Corps and Ready.gov should be 
organized more effectively to coordinate messages and media use; and a “culture of 
preparedness” should be established throughout the nation. 
 
• Allow federal agencies with Emergency Support Function (ESF) responsibility to 
budget for preparedness activities.  The National Security Special Events (NSSE) are 
not a budget line-item, which means that departments must absorb these costs in their 
regular budget.  This is a disincentive to invest in preparedness efforts.  In addition, it 
was noted that, unless the Stafford Act is invoked, FEMA does not pay for the ESFs costs 
incurred by other agencies or organizations.    
 
• Articulate a clearer vision for the nation on preparedness integration that describes 
how all the pieces work together.  Plans should include real world descriptions of the 
roles of various federal agencies; establish how states and federal agencies will work 
together before disasters strike and why preparedness integration is important; and 
describe what the public can expect from effective preparedness integration. 
 
• Remove barriers that continue to exist between FEMA organizations and programs 
that impede preparedness integration.  Participants said that silos exist at all levels of 
government and have resulted in a lack of cooperation and collaboration among agencies. 
Overlapping and duplicative efforts have wasted preparedness funds. 
 
• Engage stakeholders in the early stages of policy and program development.  
Existing FEMA engaged efforts to date must be assessed and revised when needed. 
Additional effort and new methods should be developed to listen to, acknowledge, and 
act upon stakeholder comments and concerns. 
 
Panel Findings and Recommendations 
 
The Panel found that active engagement with stakeholder groups and the general public is critical 
to preparedness and can help FEMA improve agency operations, policies, and programs.   
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 6 
 
 
 
 
Based upon the results of the regional office survey and the stakeholder dialogue, the Panel 
found that FEMA needs to expand and improve its engagement of stakeholders.  In order to 
make stakeholders true partners in the national preparedness mission, FEMA should:   
 
• Establish clear processes for stakeholder engagement at all levels. 
• Provide assistance to regional offices in developing their stakeholder engagement. 
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• Promote free and effective exchanges on the emergency management issues under 
discussion. 
• Provide stakeholders with the opportunity to give input on proposed emergency 
management policies, plans, and programs, as well as on headquarters and regional office 
services. 
• Provide timely feedback to stakeholders about how their input has been used. 
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA take steps to improve stakeholder engagement and 
relationships at all levels, in accordance with these principles.  
 
To implement this recommendation, FEMA should: 
 
• Review existing stakeholder engagement practices in light recent administration guidance 
to promote “transparency, public participation, and collaboration” in government and to 
“strengthen our democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness.” 
• Review and assess the status of existing relationships with stakeholders to: 
o Define key values and principles that should guide engagement and relationships; 
o Include stakeholders in development processes; and 
o Use all available tools, including collaborative technologies, for stakeholder 
engagement.  
• Review and assess efforts targeting members of the public to: 
o Expand strategies to build public awareness; 
o Integrate messaging across all programmatic areas. 
• Develop stakeholder working groups in each region to help improve FEMA’s activities, 
policies, and programs.  
• Engage the general public in personal preparedness by utilizing known effective behavior 
change strategies already in use by other federal agencies.   
• Collaborate with other federal agencies, such as CDC, that have developed effective 
practices in citizen engagement on preparedness issues.  
 
Challenge IV.  Ineffective Internal Business Practices 
 
While focusing on preparedness integration and robust regional offices, the Panel encountered 
outmoded internal business practices consistent with the findings of previous studies by GAO 
and DHS/OIG.  These inadequate business practices undercut mission-support functions and 
jeopardize FEMA’s ability to develop and maintain a national preparedness system.  Among the 
problems identified during the course of this study were:  
 
• FEMA’s Five-Year Strategic Human Capital Plan does not meet PKEMRA specifications 
and was submitted a year late; 
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• FEMA does not track the number of on-site contractors supporting permanent full-time 
employees; 
• FEMA’s Human Capital Plan does not describe a strategy for building a diverse high-
quality workforce;27  
• The reported length of time in recruiting, securing clearance and hiring new employees is 
unacceptable; 
• An “over-hire” situation in FY 2009 required a several-month hiring “slowdown”; and 
• A “command and control” orientation at FEMA headquarters that impedes efficient and 
effective operations. 
 
This section discusses the steps FEMA has taken to address these issues, outlines the remaining 
challenges, and concludes with the Panel’s findings and recommendations.  
 
FEMA’s Actions to Improve Internal Business Processes and Develop a Strategic Human 
Capital Plan 
 
A number of GAO and DHS IG reviews of FEMA business practices have been conducted since 
PKEMRA was enacted in 2006.  Table 5 summarizes the relevant findings of several GAO 
studies, which highlight the importance of sound internal business practices to the successful 
accomplishment of the FEMA mission. 
 
                                                 
27 FEMA’s plan includes a table to demonstrate diversity by race and national origin, but does not break this 
information down by gender.  Nearly 71 percent of the FEMA PFT workforce is Caucasian.  Noting that the 
representation of African Americans and Native Americans in the PFT workforce “is above the average of the rest 
of government and the CLF,” the plan also acknowledges that these groups are under-represented in leadership 
positions.27  Hispanics and Asian/Pacific Islanders are under-represented in the agency as a whole and in leadership 
positions.  The plan includes a table showing that FEMA’s workforce is older than the federal government’s as a 
whole.  By February 2010, over 20 percent of the agency’s PFT workforce will be eligible to retire.  Over the next 
five years, an increasing number of FEMA’s employees not only will become eligible to retire, but will actually do 
so.   
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Table 5 
Summary of Key Internal Business Process Findings from Recent GAO Reports28 
 
 
The DHS Office of the Inspector General completed a review in March 2008 that assessed 
FEMA’s preparedness for the next catastrophic disaster.29  This review covered the following 
issues: 
                                                 
28  Each of these reports is cited in the Appendix C (“Resource and Reference Materials”). 
29  Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, OIG-08-34, FEMA's Preparedness for the 
Next Catastrophic Disaster. Washington, D.C.: 2008.  
GAO Report 
Topic Summary of FEMA Actions and Issues 
National 
Preparedness  
(April 2009) 
• FEMA has developed program guidance and systems to track corrective actions that 
federal/state governments need to take to implement the National Exercise Program; 
it has also established reporting guidance for state preparedness programs. 
• FEMA needs to establish a program management plan, ensure exercises follow 
program guidance, include an assessment of capabilities within its project 
management plan, and integrate system elements.   
Emergency 
Management  
(March 2009) 
• Due to weak internal controls, FEMA made improper and potentially fraudulent 
payments to Hurricane Katrina disaster assistance applicants who used invalid 
information. 
• Pursuant to PKEMRA, FEMA developed an electronic database to counter improper 
payments. 
• FEMA needs to improve its leadership, capabilities, and accountability controls for 
disaster management.  Additional steps must be taken to ensure that applicant 
information is integrated with disbursement and payment records. 
Disaster 
Recovery-Gulf 
Coast  
(December 2008) 
• FEMA is working to improve the timeliness of the public assistance process and 
hired more long-term staff to function as a single point of contact for Hurricane 
Gustav and Ike. 
• FEMA needs to improve information sharing within the public assistance process 
and enhance continuity/communication regarding staff rotation on public assistance 
projects. 
• FEMA needs to develop a more accurate system to count the number of ongoing 
projects and estimate project costs. 
Actions to 
Implement the 
Post-Katrina Act 
(November 2008) 
• FEMA is working to transform business processes and identify IT development 
opportunities to achieve a more seamless information sharing environment among its 
three distinct personnel and asset tracking systems. 
• FEMA is increasing National Emergency Management Information System 
(NEMIS) to process concurrent requests and intends to complete alignment of IT 
systems with mission needs in FY 2010. 
• FEMA’s actions in this area are a work-in-progress. 
Budget Issues 
(January 2007) 
• FEMA has multiple and disparate systems managed by different offices to gather 
information about staffing levels—resulting in inadequate data on resource 
allocation among programs, projects, and activities, as well as inadequate data on 
staffing levels and appropriations allocated for grant programs. 
• FEMA needs to collect data that enables managers to monitor progress and support 
resource priorities, as well as develop business continuity plans. 
 47
• Overall Planning; 
• Coordination and Support; 
• Interoperable Communications; 
• Logistics; 
• Evacuations; 
• Housing; 
• Disaster Workforce; 
• Mission Assignments; and 
• Acquisition Management. 
 
Two of the IG’s three March 2008 recommendations dealt with the need to improve FEMA’s 
internal management practices.  The IG recommended that FEMA develop and sustain a system 
for tracking the progress of programs, initiatives, and enhancements using project management 
tools such as Quad charts or Gantt charts.  This could be used to share information with both 
internal and external stakeholders, as well as provide decision makers with necessary 
information to meet their management responsibilities.  The IG also recommended that FEMA 
provide regular updates regarding progress on all major preparedness initiatives and projects.  
 
Although the Panel was not tasked with conducting an examination of FEMA’s information 
systems, it became clear that the agency faces some information systems challenges.  There 
appear to be opportunities for automation of agency operations.  For example, regional personnel 
are unable to track the status of grants and disaster declarations through an automated system.  In 
addition, regional grant officials reported that they do not have electronic access to all of the 
records on existing grants that are needed to fulfill their post-award auditing function.  
 
While reviewing FEMA’s actions to integrate preparedness and build robust regional offices, the 
Panel became especially concerned about FEMA’s human capital planning.  As the agency 
worked to meet the requirements of PKEMRA over the last several years, it has significantly 
increased the size of the permanent full-time (PFT) FEMA workforce.  After hovering at the 
2,200 level between 2003 and 2006, the number of PFT staff increased by 14 percent in FY 
2007, 25 percent in FY 2008, and 17 percent in the first seven months of FY 2009.  As shown in 
Figure 19, FEMA’s permanent full-time workforce increased by 66 percent between from 
October 2003 to April 2009.   
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Figure 19 
Growth in FEMA’s Permanent Full-Time Workforce 
FY 2003 – April 2009 
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Source:  FEMA, Workforce Data, FY 2003 - April 2009 
 
This workforce growth occurred without the benefit of a comprehensive human capital plan and 
during a period of significant change in leadership and direction for the agency.     
 
Compounding these significant challenges, FEMA’s workforce is highly differentiated.  
Compared to many other federal agencies, FEMA uses a large number of workforce categories.  
Table 6 lists the multiple workforce categories used by FEMA.30 
                                                 
30 The FY07 appropriation included authority to convert up to 250 designated Stafford Act (i.e. 4-Year CORE) 
positions, which are funded out of the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), to permanent full-time (PFT) positions that 
would be funded out of the agency’s Administrative and Regional Operations account. The goal over the next three 
years is to convert all 799 4-Year CORE positions to PFT positions.  
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Table 6 
FEMA Workforce Categories 
 
Category Description 
PAS Presidential appointments made with the advice and consent of the Senate to positions in which 
the incumbent serves at the pleasure of the President. 
SES Non-
Career 
White House Office of Presidential Personnel must approve appointment; appointed without 
regard to competitive requirements; serve at the pleasure of the agency head; have no appeal 
rights; are not eligible for SES performance awards (may receive other agency awards). 
Schedule C Appointments to positions in which the incumbent serves at the pleasure of the agency head; 
these positions are excepted from the competitive service by law, by Executive order, or by the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) based on their responsibility for determining or 
advocating agency policy or their confidential character. 
SES Career Established by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978; fill managerial, supervisory, and policy 
positions above grade 15 of the General Schedule; major link between Presidential appointees 
and the rest of the federal workforce. 
GS Permanent 
Full-Time 
Employees 
Appointed under Title 5; protected by civil service rules; work full-time. 
GS Permanent 
Part-Time 
Employees 
Appointed under Title 5; part-time employee working between 16 and 32 hours a week (or 32 to 
64 hours during a biweekly pay period in the case of a flexible or compressed work schedule); 
protected by civil service rules. 
Temporary 
Full-Time 
Employee working full-time on a temporary appointment lasting no more than one year the 
agency anticipates no permanent need for the employee.  
Temporary 
Part-Time 
Employee working full-time on a temporary appointment lasting no more than one year the 
agency anticipates no permanent need for the employee. 
TIE Temporary Intermittent Employee. 
STEP Student Temporary Employment Program.  These are employees who are students that generally 
serve on temporary appointments limited to 1 year or less, working part-time during the school 
year and full-time during summers and vacations. 
DAE 
(Currently 
“Reservists”) 
Disaster Assistance Employees only used to perform DAE-related work on specific disasters, 
emergencies, projects, and activities of a non-continuous nature; DAE-Ls are local hires for 120 
days, paid at prevailing local rates, that may be renewed for an additional 120 days; DAE-Rs are 
on FEMA personnel roles for 24 months, activated when need arises, and may not work more 
than 18 months in a 24 month period. 
DTE Disaster Temporary Employees; FEMA no longer uses this category. 
CORE Cadre of On-Call Response and Recovery Employees funded under the Stafford Act; two-year 
COREs serve for twenty-four months and are eligible for renewal; four-year COREs serve for 
forty-eight months and are eligible for renewal; FEMA has been converting the four-year 
COREs into PFT positions.  
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Table 7 shows the number of FEMA employees by category from FY 2003 to April 2009.  
Individuals in the DAE/DTE (“Reservists”) and CORE categories have constituted over 70 
percent of the workforce each year.  As of April 2009, the Reservists and CORE employees 
constituted over 77 percent of the total workforce.   
 
Table 7 
FEMA Total Workforce by Category 
FY 2003 – April 2009 
 
Category FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 April 09
Political 31 29 22 20 23 30 15 
PFT 2,264 2,274 2,290 2,204 2,517 3,142 3,662 
PPT 10 8 9 5 7 8 7 
TFT 172 138 197 438 215 0 286 
TPT 0 0 0 0 0 210 0 
TIE 5 2 2 2 0 0 0 
STEP 16 18 9 40 46 2 6 
DAE 3,498 6,156 6,527 10,258 8,606 8,092 8,891 
DTE 1,918 2,373 3,669 344 3 0 0 
CORE 732 725 704 4,802 5,441 4,807 4,069 
Other 12 9 0 2 0 2 2 
Source:  FEMA, Workforce Data, FY 2003 – April 2009 
 
Reservists and CORE employees are generally unavailable for preparedness or other ongoing 
activities because the Stafford Act restricts their work to specific designated and declared 
disasters.  As shown in Table 8, the vast majority of the headquarters National Preparedness 
Directorate workforce are permanent full-time staff.  Compared to the FEMA workforce as a 
whole, Reservist and CORE employees constitute a much smaller proportion (currently 7 
percent) of the preparedness workforce.  Reservist and CORE employees have constituted 
between 0 percent (FY 2003) and 23.6 percent (FY 2007) of the national preparedness 
workforce. 
   
Table 8 
FEMA NPD Preparedness Workforce by Category 
FY 2003 – April 2009 
 
Category FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 April 09 
Political 1 2 2 0 0 2 0 
PFT 59 215 203 77 95 228 260 
PPT 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
TFT 8 14 11 3 0 0 10 
TPT 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 
TIE 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 
STEP 0 9 5 3 1 0 0 
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Category FY 03 FY 04 FY 05 FY 06 FY 07 FY 08 April 09 
DAE 0 5 10 11 13 15 14 
DTE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CORE 0 6 5 12 17 15 7 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 68 253 237 106 127 271 292 
Source:  FEMA, Workforce Data, FY 2003 – April 2009 
 
With PKEMRA implementation underway, FEMA should consider whether the existing 
allocation across these categories is sufficient to meet its objectives for the present and its vision 
for the future.  Despite the complexity of the workforce and the other human capital challenges 
discussed in this report, FEMA has not made sufficient progress in developing a strategic human 
capital plan that meets the requirements of PKEMRA.  
These requirements include:  
 
• A workforce gap analysis that addresses the 
following areas: 
o Critical skills and competencies that will be 
needed in the workforce for 10 years after 
enactment of the law;  
o Skills and competencies of the FEMA 
workforce on the day before the date of 
enactment of PKEMRA and projected trends 
in that workforce based on expected losses 
due to retirement and other attrition; and  
o Staffing levels for each category of employee, 
including gaps that must be addressed to 
ensure that FEMA’s workforce continues to 
possess the critical skills and competencies 
needed.  
 
• A plan of action to address the gaps in critical 
skills and competencies identified by the 
workforce gap analysis, including: 
o Specific goals and objectives for recruiting 
and retaining employees, including the use of 
recruitment and retention bonuses; 
o Specific strategies and program objectives to 
develop, train, deploy, compensate, motivate, 
and retain employees;  
o Specific strategies to recruit staff with 
experience serving in multiple state agencies 
responsible for emergency management; and  
Key Principles of Workforce 
Planning 
9 Set strategic direction.  Involve 
top management, employees, 
and other stakeholders. 
9 Workforce gap analysis.  
Determine the critical skills and 
competencies needed to achieve 
current and future programmatic 
results. 
9 Workforce strategies to fill the 
gaps.  Develop tailored 
strategies to address gaps in 
number, deployment, and 
alignment of human capital 
approaches. 
9 Build capability to support 
workforce strategies.  Build the 
capability needed to address 
administrative, educational, and 
other requirements important to 
support workforce planning 
strategies. 
9 Evaluate and revise strategies.  
Monitor and evaluate the 
agency’s progress toward its 
human capital goals and the 
contribution that human capital 
results have made toward 
achieving programmatic results. 
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o Specific strategies to develop, train, and rapidly deploy a Surge Capacity Force. 
 
Like other outside reviewers, the Panel and study team have found it difficult to obtain complete 
and accurate human capital data from FEMA.  The Panel believes this is due to the challenges 
associated with the frequent shifting of organizational resources over the past six years; the lack 
of a single system to track and account for the workforce; the complexities associated with 
tracking multiple workforce categories; and challenges with FEMA’s human resource 
management systems. 
 
These shortcomings had significant consequences in the spring of 2009, as FEMA had to 
establish an informal hiring freeze because it had “over-hired.”  The Senate Appropriations 
Committee Report expressed disappointment that “a lack of internal controls has led to 
significant discrepancies in data sets for staff on-board and the funding level needed to support 
those staff.”31  
 
Panel Findings and Recommendation 
 
The Panel has observed that FEMA faces challenges in handling routine business process and 
management tasks.  In particular, the Panel found that FEMA’s human capital planning, 
processes, and systems should be significantly improved, and FEMA should invest in data 
systems that will support human capital planning and management.  
 
  
RECOMMENDATION 7 
 
 
 
 
The Panel recommends that FEMA strengthen its internal business practices, especially in 
the area of human capital planning.   
 
To implement this recommendation, FEMA should: 
 
• Develop a valid five-year Strategic Human Capital Plan, consistent with the key 
principles of workforce planning described above, that includes the following elements: 
 
o Workforce gap analysis; 
o Strategies to fill identified gaps; 
o Strategies to recruit and retain the knowledge, skills, and abilities required to meet 
the agency’s preparedness integration mission; 
o Strategies to ensure that the regions have a workforce with the necessary 
knowledge, skills, and abilities; 
o Strategies to build a diverse, high-quality workforce; 
                                                 
31 Senate Appropriations Committee, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill Report (June 18, 2009), 
p. 99.   
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o Strategies to maintain critical institutional knowledge in the wake of the looming 
retirement of a considerable portion of the workforce over the next five years; 
o Mechanisms, such as training programs, to build capacity to support workforce 
strategies;  
o Mechanisms to determine an appropriate allocation of personnel resources 
between headquarters and the regions; and 
o Mechanisms to monitor and evaluate progress.32 
 
• Develop a strategy to address and improve other internal business practices, including a 
timetable and performance expectations. 
• Assess existing information systems—especially in the human capital area—to ensure 
that accurate, reliable, and timely data are available to drive management planning and 
decision-making.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As noted in the introduction to this report, emergency management in the 21st Century is a 
daunting task.  The threats this nation faces are more numerous and more extreme than at any 
time in our history.  As the FEMA Administrator has recently articulated, the stakes could not be 
higher: 
   
An incident of catastrophic proportions has the potential to imperil thousands of 
people, devastate hundreds of communities, and produce far-reaching economic 
and social effects.  The scope of needs will be large, immediate, novel and 
profound, and the entire national emergency management, public health, security, 
law enforcement, critical infrastructure, medical and all other components that 
                                                 
32 In comments on the agency review draft, FEMA noted that recent actions should “address the issues raised.”  
Responding to Congressional direction in the FY 2009 Homeland Security Appropriations Act, FEMA began 
working with the Homeland Security Institute in September 2009 to develop a comprehensive workforce plan by 
late FY 2011.  According to FEMA, “The assessment will provide an overview of workforce demographics, 
determine the kinds of work currently performed by FEMA employees, and assess the agency’s operational 
capabilities. It also will provide a crosswalk between various HR data sources (e.g., National Finance Center Data, 
Automated Deployment Database, Manpower Database, etc.).  The ‘As Is’ Assessment is the first phase of a four 
phase FEMA-wide strategic workforce planning initiative.  Phases II, III, and IV will address the Key Principles of 
Workforce Planning [identified by the Academy].  Phase II will set the strategic direction, determining the hazards 
and environmental factors FEMA must be able to address to meet the emergency management needs of the future.  
Phase III successfully address the hazards/environmental factors defined in Phase II.  It will also include a gap 
analysis between the “As Is” workforce and the workforce of the future. Phase IV will identify the strategies to close 
the gaps (including recruitment, development, retention and engagement strategies) and begin strategy 
implementation.  It also will define the optimum mix of positions (appointment status, job series, etc.) and 
organizational structure.  And it will lay the groundwork for institutionalizing workforce planning to ensure FEMA 
monitors and measures progress; assesses results; revises its strategies, as necessary; and maintains a sound 
understanding of workforce issues.” 
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make up community must be prepared to respond, and respond in ways that lie 
outside the normal paradigms in which we traditionally operate.33 
 
In this challenging environment, FEMA is working to build a prepared and resilient nation—a 
task that depends upon the concerted actions of a large, diverse, and diffuse group of partners, 
stakeholders, and citizens.  The national preparedness system is, both literally and figuratively, 
only as strong as its weakest link—a lesson learned the hard way when two levee breaches in 
New Orleans left more than 80 percent of the city under water.  FEMA must view the system 
holistically, recognizing its component parts and interdependencies.  FEMA cannot and should 
not try to exert full control over the nation’s emergency management system, but it has a critical 
leadership role to play in this system by providing a results-oriented framework that: 
 
• Provides new opportunities to leverage the resources, capabilities, and energy of the 
population across the country; 
• Relies on headquarters and regional offices as repositories of expertise;     
• Builds more transparency into its operations; 
• Becomes more open in its relations with external groups; and 
• Engages the public as key stakeholders in all phases of preparedness.34 
 
Based upon the research conducted for this study, the Panel determined that FEMA has made 
significant progress in achieving PKEMRA’s mandate for preparedness integration and robust 
regional offices, but it faces continuing challenges in certain areas.  It must build upon progress 
to date to fully integrate preparedness, to strengthen the capacity of the regional offices, establish 
working partnerships with stakeholders, and improve internal business practices that support 
mission-related programs.  With new leadership and a charge from the President to be “open,” 
“participatory,” and “collaborative,”35 FEMA has the opportunity to develop a shared vision for 
national preparedness that actively engages and empowers partners, stakeholders, and citizens. 
 
                                                 
33 Written Statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of 
Homeland Security, “Post-Katrina: What it Takes to Cut the Bureaucracy and Assure a More Rapid Response After 
a Catastrophic Disaster”, before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee of 
Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management U.S. House of Representatives Washington, 
DC, July 27, 2009, p. 4. 
34 Derived from, The Next Government of the United States: Why Our Institutions Fail Us and How to Fix Them, 
Donald F. Kettl, New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2009. 
35 Presidential Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Transparency and Open 
Government, January 21, 2009. 
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INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED OR CONTACTED36 
(Titles and locations listed are as of the time of the Academy’s contact.) 
 
 
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
 
Headquarters 
 
Vanessa Burnett—NIMS Specialist, Resource Planning and Coordination Branch 
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Tracy Trautman—Deputy Assistant Administrator, Grant Programs Directorate 
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Lynn Wright—Branch Chief, Grant Services Branch 
 
                                                 
36 As part of this study, the Academy conducted a regional office survey and online stakeholder dialogue.  These anonymous 
respondents/participants are not included in this contact list.   
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FEMA Safety and Preparedness Expo
Oakland, CA, June 25 2008—Four-year old golden retriever and current member of the California Urban 
Search and Rescue Team 4 (USAR) “Sandy” is present at the FEMA Safety Preparedness Expo tent.  The 
expo had themes of safety and preparedness highlighted with search and rescue capabilities, recovery 
tools, and mitigation procedures to assist in preparing for and responding to disasters.  Photo by FEMA/
Adam DuBrowa.
Mitigation Assistance and Flood Insurance
Houston, TX, September 23, 2008—At a Disaster Recovery Center, a FEMA Mitigation Specialist talks to a 
victim of Hurricane Ike about ways to minimize damage to her home and property from future storms.  Photo 
by FEMA/Greg Henshall.
Disaster Preparedness in Colorado
Denver, CO, June 13, 2009—A FEMA staff member helps a child learn about disaster preparedness during 
an event sponsored by West Metro Fire Rescue in Denver.  The family event—now in its 15th year—fea-
tures a range of safety and preparedness activities, including practice 911 calls, evacuation from an infl ated 
Fire House, and hands-on events and search-and-rescue demonstrations by the Colorado Urban Search 
and Rescue Task Force 1 (US&R TF-1).  Photo by FEMA/Jerry DeFelice.
FEMA Facility
New Orleans, LA, February 13, 2006—FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer Scott Wells and Brigadier Gen-
eral Robert Crear Commander of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, who is in charge of the construction at 
Southern University at New Orleans campus, greet each other at the Grand Opening Ribbon cutting of the 
Facility FEMA is providing for them.  FEMA provided the Southern University at New Orleans (SUNO) with 
45 Modular Buildings for instructional classrooms, offi ces, cafeteria, and facilities staffed for student educa-
tion and FEMA travel trailers to house students and staff. Southern University at New Orleans is the only 
campus in the United States to be built by FEMA and a state.  Photo by FEMA/Marvin Nauman.
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